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New Centre for 
the Future of 
Intelligence 
Cambridge has a distinguished record  
in the history of computing, with alumni 
such as Charles Babbage, Alan Turing,  
and the AI pioneer Margaret Boden,  
who read Moral Sciences with Margaret 
Masterman and Casimir Lewy in the 
1950s. Now, thanks to a £10 million  
grant from the Leverhulme Trust to a 
team led by Professor Huw Price, the 
University is to establish a Centre to 
explore the challenges of the future  
of machine intelligence.
Human-level intelligence is familiar in 
biological ‘hardware’ – it happens inside 
our skulls. Many researchers expect that 
AI will reach a similar level within this 
century. Freed of biological constraints, 
machines might become more intelligent 
than us – as Turing himself predicted, 
sixty years ago.
The Leverhulme Centre for the Future 
of Intelligence will explore the 
ramifications of this potentially epoch-
making development, both short and 
long term. The Centre brings together 
computer scientists, philosophers, social 
scientists, psychologists, lawyers and 
others, and spans institutions as well  
as disciplines. It is a collaboration led  
by Cambridge with links to the  
Oxford Martin School at the University  
of Oxford, Imperial College London, and 
the University of California, Berkeley. 
As Huw Price puts it: “Machine 
intelligence will be one of the defining 
themes of our century, and the challenge 
of ensuring that we make good use of  
its opportunities is one that we all  
face together. The Centre will bring 
together some of the best of human 
intelligence, to help us to make the  
best of artificial intelligence”.
From the Chair
Tim Crane
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The award of an honorary degree last 
summer to the distinguished Newnham 
alumna Judith Jarvis Thomson is a 
testament not just to her philosophical 
achievements but also to the wide 
relevance of philosophy. Professor Thomson 
is well known for her discussions of the 
‘trolley problem’ in ethics: faced with a 
trolley hurtling down a rail track towards 
five people, should you divert it onto a track 
containing just one person? This thought 
experiment has reached beyond academic 
philosophy into the wider intellectual 
world, from neuroscience to best-selling 
popular books.
It is sometimes said that philosophy is 
a highly abstract endeavour which is not 
closely related to other forms of acquiring 
knowledge. Although clearly true of 
some parts of the subject, the history of 
philosophy shows a more complex picture. 
In Aristotle’s time, for example, there was 
no sharp distinction between philosophical 
and other knowledge, as Sophia Connell’s 
piece on page 2 illustrates. And a lot of our 
current work in the Faculty has involved 
connections with other areas of knowledge, 
some of it supported by external grants 
e.g. Alex Oliver’s Trusting Banks project 
(featured in the last newsletter) and my 
own project on non-reductive approaches 
to the study of the mind (see page 8). This 
year we are delighted to announce Huw 
Price’s success in gaining a major grant 
from the Leverhulme Trust to found an 
interdisciplinary Centre for the Future of 
Intelligence (page 1).
Grant-funded research projects are an 
important part of the academic landscape 
in philosophy these days. But they are not 
everything, and they supplement rather 
than replace our core activities: individual 
philosophical research and the supervision 
of undergraduate and graduate students. 
Where the latter is concerned, we continue 
to pursue our long-term aim to raise 
sufficient funds to support all our research 
students. I would be delighted to talk to 
any of our alumni who are interested in the 
progress we are making towards this target.
Judith Jarvis Thomson received an honorary degree from Cambridge University.  Photo: D. H. Mellor
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Aristotle was fascinated by life. An 
astonishingly talented empirical zoologist, 
he detailed the anatomy and behaviour 
of a large variety of animals, as well as 
more general biological processes such as 
perception, voluntary movement of the 
limbs, sensation, digestion, respiration and 
nutrition. In one of his most complicated 
and advanced works on biology, the 
Generation of Animals (GA), Aristotle 
undertook to explain animal reproduction. 
He covered every animal he knew of 
from insects through to elephants, and 
attempted to provide a set of unified 
theories to explain, among other things, the 
roles of the sexes, embryonic development, 
multiple pregnancies, hereditary 
resemblances and infertility. 
My recently published book, Aristotle on 
Female Animals, is the first monograph for 
over 30 years to concentrate on this treatise. 
It seeks to bring to modern attention 
the coherency and power of the work, 
in particular the way in which Aristotle’s 
investigations into the most difficult 
issues in biology show him adapting and 
reimagining key philosophical principles. 
Aristotle’s philosophical interests in 
living phenomena are well known. The 
perpetuation of living beings in all their 
complexity, including their inclinations 
and abilities, fascinated him and informed 
his teleological philosophical outlook. 
Although there has been a burgeoning 
recent interest in Aristotle’s biology and 
philosophy of biology, the GA continues 
to be somewhat marginalised. When it 
is looked to, this is often in a piecemeal 
fashion. Part of the difficulty is that any 
broader insights are often overshadowed 
by a supposed contradiction in doctrine 
concerning the female role in reproduction. 
The male contributes form and the female 
matter but the female can and does 
contribute inherited features. How is that 
possible if her role is completely empty and 
indeterminate? On top of this issue there is 
the fact that the text is so sexist. It has been 
common for students of feminism to cut 
their teeth by criticising Aristotle’s view of 
female biology. 
These two interpretative traditions tend 
to clash with and influence each other in 
ways that prevent us from understanding 
and appreciating the content of the GA. 
To maintain the supposed consistency 
traditional scholars concentrate on the first 
two Books of the treatise, where we find 
the most hierarchized view of the sexes. 
They attempt to ignore the more positive 
characterisation of the female role found 
throughout the work, particularly in the 
last three Books. They also try to deny that 
Aristotle is sexist (at least perniciously so) 
positing that he is led by his metaphysics to 
come up with his theory. 
 Feminist scholars take on board the 
emphasis on the first two Books, rightly 
finding much sexism there. But they also 
do not understand Aristotle’s theory of the 
female role, since they overlook his more 
comprehensive account in the treatise as 
a whole. My book argues that the female 
animal and the female contribution to 
generation has very often been simplified 
and misunderstood in Aristotelian biology 
and that much can be gained by a 
reassessment of this issue. 
The treatise explains that male and 
female both have seminal residues which 
are derived from blood. The female 
contribution is the material cause in the 
context of Aristotle’s causal teleology. As 
my book shows, this matter is extremely 
specialised, containing complex potentials 
(dunameis). Aristotelian matter is never 
empty or indeterminate and cannot be 
equated with bare post-Newtonian matter. 
In hereditary resemblance, Aristotle explains 
that it is movements or changes (kinêseis) 
in both male and female contributions to 
generation that determine resemblance. 
This falls in line with his idea that both male 
and female seed are residues of nutriment 
in the process of becoming the parts of 
their living functioning bodies. 
By better understanding Aristotle’s 
account of the female role, and by placing 
the processes involved in reproduction 
within the more general context of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics and philosophy, 
we can solve the interpretative dilemmas 
posed by traditionalists and feminists. 
There is no contradiction in his account of 
the female role in hereditary resemblance, 
and so there is no need to exaggerate 
the sexism in the text in order to attack it. 
Disentangling the GA from these negative 
assessments allows for many insights about 
Aristotle’s broader philosophical outlook, 
such as his views on the role of form and 
function in biology, the dynamism of his 
metaphysics, and the way that he is able 
to incorporate new empirical insights by 
providing flexible frameworks for new 
discoveries. By looking again at Aristotle 
on female animals I have found many fresh 
ways to understand his philosophy.
Sophia Connell is an Affiliated Lecturer 
in the Faculty.  Her book: Aristotle 
on Female Animals: A Study of the 
Generation of Animals is available  
 from Cambridge University Press.
Aristotle on Female Animals
Sophia Connell
Detail of Da Vinci’s studies of embryos.
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China Matters
John Marenbon
West Gate of Peking University by 維基小霸王  via Wikimedia Commons.
Confucius.
Ten years ago I was talking to a friend from 
China who was studying in Cambridge. 
“Surely there’s no one in China”, I once said, 
“who specializes in my subject” (Western 
philosophy in the Middle Ages). She 
disagreed: every subject you could think  
of is studied somewhere in China, she 
insisted. I thought her patriotism had  
got the better of her — until, three years 
later, I was giving a paper in Notre Dame. 
The most acute question after it came  
from a young Chinese professor, Liu Zhe, 
there on a visit from Beijing. He worked  
on phenomenology but his colleague in  
the Department of Foreign Philosophy, 
Tianyue Wu, he explained, taught and  
wrote on medieval Latin philosophy.  
Would I like to come and give some 
lectures at Peking University?
That was the beginning of a collaboration 
which is continuing. Tianyue and I organized 
a conference together in Beijing, I arranged 
regular teaching visits to Peking University 
— it stands at the very top of China’s 
meritocratic university system — and thanks 
to the British Academy’s International 
Mobility scheme, our personal collaboration 
was extended, last year, to one between 
our respective departments. 
There can be few philosophy 
departments quite so different from  
each other as the Cambridge Faculty  
of Philosophy and the Philosophy 
Department at PKU (as it is often known). 
At PKU there are five or six times as many 
university teachers as in Cambridge,  
and more than ten times the number  
of graduate students. The students at  
PKU are highly selected, and all of  
them are very clever and hard-working, 
especially the undergraduates. The 
department is divided into sections  
on Chinese Philosophy, Marxism and 
Foreign Philosophy. The Chinese 
Philosophy section is hard for a foreigner  
to penetrate, because its members  
do not usually speak English, and when 
their utterances are translated they are  
no more comprehensible than before. 
Marxism seems to be studied simply 
because it has to be; there is certainly far 
more enthusiasm for it among students in 
the West than those in China. The Foreign 
Philosophy is the intellectual, though not 
the political, heart of the department. It 
includes specialists on all the various areas 
in the history of Western Philosophy, such 
as German Idealism and French twentieth-
century philosophy, the lack of which in 
Cambridge is so regrettable, and also  
some analytical philosophers. 
Our International Mobility project 
included a conference in Cambridge  
(July 2015) with three Chinese guests, 
including Liu Zhe and Tianyue Wu, a  
variety of speakers from the Faculty  
and some invited speakers from Europe;  
a conference in Beijing, with three 
participants from the UK; and a final 
conference, in collaboration with Tim 
Crane’s New Directions in the Study of  
the Mind project. Two Cambridge 
Philosophy undergraduates also came  
to Beijing, and the student session was  
the most intellectually exciting of the  
whole occasion.
The topic of the conferences was 
‘Thinking, Immateriality and the Self’. I had 
chosen this topic because one of the 
distinctive features of philosophy in the 
Long Middle Ages, I imagined, is the large 
place it gives to incorporeal concrete 
things, such as souls, intelligences and 
angels. But the various papers, shorter 
comments and questions from specialists  
in medieval Latin and Arabic thought  
and in early modern philosophy, and  
from contemporary philosophers, 
suggested that even this very starting  
point needs to be questioned. It is not clear 
what exactly is meant by ‘incorporeal’ or 
‘immaterial’ entities either in a medieval  
or a contemporary context, nor what, if  
any, are the tensions between admitting 
their existence and naturalism. 
When a project ends in this way, by 
making it clear that we know less than we 
thought when we began, it has certainly 
been a success!
John Marenbon is Honorary Professor 
of Medieval Philosophy and a Senior 
Research Fellow of Trinity College.
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John Locke Lectures 2015:  
Accommodating Injustice
Rae Langton
As philosophers, we could do a better job 
of accommodating injustice — in the sense 
of attending to actual injustice, making 
space for it in our theorizing, instead of 
being so ready to build our castles in the 
air. But as speakers and hearers, we do 
a good job of accommodating injustice 
— in the sense of adjusting to injustice, 
and helping it along. We do many things 
with words, as J.L. Austin said, and what 
we do with words can help build and 
perpetuate injustice in ways that follow rules 
of accommodation. By ‘accommodation’ I 
mean a process of adjustment that tends 
to make speech acts count as ‘correct play’. 
This familiar phenomenon has been studied 
by linguists and philosophers, and occurs 
in widely varying contexts, from informal 
presupposition introductions (‘Even George 
could win’), to ceremonial performatives (‘I 
hereby name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’). 
It has a four-part pattern, described by 
David Lewis: an utterance, a requirement, 
the holding of certain felicity conditions, 
and a felicitous outcome. The implications 
of accommodation for philosophy of 
language have been discussed widely; 
for epistemology, to some degree; for 
ethics and politics, barely at all. I shall put 
a spotlight on the way injustice feeds into 
accommodation, and emerges from it. 
We shall be looking at the darker side 
of something with a familiar bright side. 
Accommodation is ubiquitous, inevitable, 
and responsible for the good, as well as the 
bad, in our lives as speakers and hearers. 
Knowledge, humour, and intimacy all 
depend on it. Even accommodation’s dark 
side relies on something bright, on human 
virtues, our powers to make sense of each 
other, trust each other, and co-operate.  
But, to borrow Iago’s words, it can turn  
those very virtues ‘into pitch’, and out of  
our own goodness make a snare that  
does enmesh us all.
When we are alert to accommodation’s 
pattern, we will see many instances,  
said Lewis. He was right. Philosophers  
have focused on presupposition, and 
standards for knowledge. But there 
is much more. Authority follows rules 
of accommodation, and this includes 
epistemic and practical authority (Lecture 
1). Norms follow rules of accommodation, 
through commands, standard-shifting, 
generics, and presuppositions about 
normality (Lecture 2). Knowledge follows 
rules of accommodation, through lies and 
misleading assertions, standard-shifting, 
stake-shifting, and the adjustment of 
credibility and confidence (Lecture 3). 
These in turn silence some speakers, by 
placing limits on ‘correct play’, when 
attempted speech acts misfire, or fail 
to be accommodated (Lecture 4). Our 
accommodating attitudes, as hearers, are 
part of the problem, and they have two 
roles, as psychological effects, and as felicity 
conditions for the speaker. (Lecture 5).
This means that our account of 
accommodation needs extending. It 
needs to be mapped at two levels: first, 
an evolving abstract normative structure, 
tracking the speech acts performed 
(‘illocution’ in Austin’s terms); and second, 
the evolving epistemic and psychological 
states of participants, tracking some 
significant effects (‘perlocution’ in Austin’s 
Rae Langton. Photo: Merlijn Doomernik
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terms). These mappings don’t compete, 
but complement each other. The account 
of evolving common ground needs 
expanding to include conative and affective 
states, as well as cognitive, to help model 
speech acts that appeal to non-doxastic 
states, including desire and emotion: 
for example, advertising, pornography, 
propaganda, and hate speech. 
Speech acts are enabled by absence, 
a hearer’s failure to block, as well as by 
presence, a hearer’s uptake: whether a 
speech act is ‘happy’ depends on extrinsic 
factors, including later acts and omissions 
of others. There are implications for 
metaphysics: a speech act’s nature at a 
given place and time depends non-causally 
on what happens elsewhere and later. 
There are implications for silence: it includes 
illocutionary failure, misfires, and failures of 
accommodation. And there are implications 
for politics: free speech requires more than 
state non-interference.
Attending to these problems thus makes 
visible some solutions (Lecture 6). Speech 
acts are revealed as things we do together 
with words, involving the attitudes, acts and 
omissions of hearers and bystanders, as well 
as speakers. Free speech looks different on 
this picture, and demands richer resources: 
the action, not merely inaction, of other 
agents — states, institutions, hearers and 
bystanders — can be needed to secure it. 
The Lectures
1. Accommodating authority 
Both the exercise and the distribution of 
authority follow rules of accommodation. 
Authority is a felicity condition for 
performing certain speech acts, such as 
knighting or firing, which themselves in 
turn can alter facts about authority. The 
conferral and removal of authority can 
happen formally, via ceremonial speech 
acts, or informally, via presupposition 
accommodation. Authority can be practical 
or epistemic. Practical authority can also be 
grounded in epistemic, as when a doctor’s 
expertise enables her to issue commands. 
Drawing on work by Ishani Maitra, I argue 
that the informal accommodation of 
epistemic and practical authority explains 
how subordinating speech can get 
authority, including informal hate speech 
that ranks certain people as inferior, and 
destroys their credibility. 
2. Accommodating norms 
Background social norms determine 
whether and how an attempted speech act 
is accommodated. Social norms themselves 
follow rules of accommodation, in a variety 
of ways: through authoritative speech acts 
of permitting or requiring; through informal 
‘conversational exercitives’ that alter 
permissibility facts within conversations (as 
Mary Kate McGowan has described); and 
through speech acts that ‘normalize’ certain 
behaviour. Presupposition-introduction 
can be a potent normalizer. Anti-semitic 
propaganda can presuppose it is normal 
to despise Jews, and that this is widely 
known. Pornography can presuppose that 
women who say ‘no’ don’t refuse, and that 
this is widely known. Presupposing that a 
behaviour is normal is a double-whammy: 
conveying that the behaviour is normal, 
and that knowledge of it is normal too. 
3. Accommodating knowledge 
Accommodation plays a routine role in this 
transmission of knowledge and ignorance, 
through assertions, and presupposition 
accommodation. Rules of accommodation 
bear on knowledge in four other ways, 
depending on one’s account of knowledge, 
and all have potential political import. 
First, standards for knowledge can shift over 
time, following rules of accommodation. 
Second, what matters can follow rules of 
accommodation — the issue of stakes. 
Third, the distribution of credibility can 
follow rules of accommodation — the 
issue of epistemic authority. Speakers can 
alter the epistemic standing of participants 
(themselves or others), benefiting through 
inflation, or suffering through loss, of 
credibility, including self-credibility. Fourth, 
accommodation enables what we can call 
maker’s knowledge of socially constructed 
truths, in the way a judge who delivers 
sentence knows what the sentence will be. 
4. Silence as accommodation failure
Justice Brandeis said the remedy for evil 
speech is ‘more speech, not enforced  
silence’: bad speech can be fought with 
good. This is admirable but mistaken. 
Besides material constraints on time, 
money, or education, there are distinctive 
structural handicaps on a capacity to fight 
bad speech with good. Sometimes it is 
difficult or impossible to get good speech 
accommodated. Illocutionary disablement 
is encountered when a speaker is allowed 
their words, but literally cannot do what they 
intend with them: for example, a woman 
says ‘No’, meaning to refuse sex, but fails to 
have her refusal recognized. Sometimes 
it is difficult or impossible to block bad 
speech, and prevent its accommodation. 
For example, it can be hard to block 
presuppositions, given the deflection of 
hearer attention, the asymmetric pliability 
of accommodation, the cost of being 
uncooperative, and the cost of contradicting 
apparent shared knowledge.
5. Accommodating attitudes
Our attitudes as hearers are involved in 
accommodation, and not only through the 
updating of belief in light of what speakers 
say. In illocutionary accommodation, our 
attitudes serve as felicity conditions for the 
force of a speaker’s utterance (cf. ‘uptake’ 
in J.L. Austin), whereas in perlocutionary 
accommodation, our attitudes are among 
the effects of a speaker’s utterance. On this 
picture, the attitudes of hearers are not 
only effects, but also partial determinants 
of what a speaker does with words. And 
accommodation will also need to include 
attitudes that go beyond belief, such as 
desire and hatred, if we are to understand 
the workings of speech that enacts norms, 
sparks desire, or recruits hearers to hatred.
6. How to undo things with words 
Rules of accommodation allow unjust 
social norms and patterns of authority to 
emerge from speech acts in informal ways, 
and from unlikely sources, even from the 
helpful acts and omissions of those who 
don’t speak. Hate speech and pornography 
exploit these mechanisms, as do social 
generics and more. If the force of a speech 
act can be enabled by failure to block, there 
are implications for the responsibility of 
individual hearers, individual bystanders, 
institutions and the state. All are more-
than-complicit fellow actors in what we do 
together with words. Given the costs and 
challenges, there can be no perfect duty to 
block or interrupt the injustices described. 
What then? 
More active individuals: the cultivation 
of epistemic virtues of alertness and 
judgement; practical virtues, capacities  
to intervene and block where one is  
able, as an imperfect duty. More active 
institutions: free speech as not merely 
non-interference, but a capability to be 
supported, requiring concrete economic 
and educational resources (cf. Martha 
Nussbaum, Susan Brison); and a role for 
the state as not only a practical, but an 
epistemic authority, promoting conditions 
for knowledge, since some knowledge is 
part and parcel of justice. 
Rae Langton is a professor in the 
Faculty, and a fellow of Newnham 
College. She gave the John Locke Lectures 
at Oxford University between 29 April 
and 3 June 2015, on which she will base 
her next book. Handouts and podcasts 
of the lectures are available from: 
www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/
john_locke_lectures. This article was also 
printed in Oxford Philosophy Magazine, 
7th Edition.
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Staﬀ  news
On 12 February 2016, Emeritus Professor 
Onora O’Neill was presented with 
the Knight Commander’s Cross of the 
Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of 
Germany for her outstanding contribution 
to moral and ethical questions of trust, 
accountability in civic life, justice and virtue.
Prof Tim Crane was awarded the 2015 
Italian Society for Neuroethics prize in 
philosophy.
Prof Rae Langton gave the 2015 Bentham 
lecture at UCL on 11 November 2015. 
She gave the Hägerström Lectures at 
Uppsala University, Sweden; the Hourani 
lectures at SUNY Buff alo, New York; and 
the Mangoletsi Lectures at Leeds University 
in 2016.
Dr Sophia Connell has been awarded 
a 2016 Pilkington Prize in recognition of 
excellence in teaching at the University. 
Dr Angela Breitenbach will lead a DAAD 
funded network on German philosophy. 
Over the next three years the network 
will bring together Cambridge researchers 
with colleagues from the University of 
Bonn, the Central European University in 
Budapest, and the University of California 
at San Diego, and with other experts from 
around the globe.
Dr Clare Chambers joined the Nuffi  eld 
Council on Bioethics Working Party on 
Cosmetic Procedures. She also gave 
the Alan Milne Memorial Address at 
Durham University. 
Chris Meyns won a Graduate Award from 
the American Philosophical Association, 
Eastern Division.
Dr Dragos Calma joined the Faculty on a 
2-year Newton International Fellowship.
Appointments
We are delighted that a number of our 
recent graduates have been appointed 
to academic posts. Lucy Campbell has 
a Teaching Assistantship at Edinburgh 
University. Emily Thomas has a lectureship 
at Durham; Steven Methven is now a 
Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Worcester 
College, Oxford. Alexis Papazoglou has a 
temporary lectureship at Royal Holloway 
University of London.
Future Events
Alumni Festival 2016
24 September 2016
Dr Paulina Sliwa will give a talk entitled ‘Acts of Faith’. Further 
details will be available from: www.alumni.cam.ac.uk. 
Cambridge Festival of Ideas 2016
17 October – 30 October 2016
Please see the Festival website: www.festivaloﬁ deas.cam.ac.uk 
for further details.
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
May 2017
Prof Peter Singer (Princeton and Melbourne Universities) will 
give the 9th Routledge Lecture. Details to be announced.
Information about other forthcoming events is available from 
the Faculty website: www.phil.cam.ac.uk/events.
People
Philosophy from
Cambridge University Press
Keep up to date with new books available in print and digital format at  
www.cambridge.org/newphilosophy
Submit your research to the  
Journal of the American Philosophical Association
The Journal of the American  
Philosophical Association publishes compelling 
research written in a way that can be appreciated by 
philosophers of every persuasion. 
It welcomes submissions in all areas of philosophy.
For information, please visit
journals.cambridge.org/apa-cfp
Visit our bookshop on Trinity Street and show your
University card for your exclusive 20% discount off books!
33334.indd   1 01/03/2016   17:03
Student Prizes
Daniel Williams (Darwin) was awarded the Matthew Buncombe 
prize for best overall achievement in the MPhil. The Craig Taylor 
prize for best performance in the Tripos went to Christopher 
Cooksley (Peterhouse) for Part IB, and Matthew van der 
Merwe (Gonville and Caius) for Part II. Sebastien Warshaw 
(Queens’ College) was awarded the Burney prize.
The 8th February 2016 was the 25th 
anniversary of Casimir Lewy’s death. 
This year also marks 10 years since 
the Faculty library, named in his 
honour, was refurbished and moved 
to its current location. A number of 
events will mark the occasion.
Casimir Lewy.
Casimir Lewy Library anniversary
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Wittgenstein thought a “serious and good 
philosophical work could be written 
consisting entirely of jokes”. I wonder: could 
there be a serious and good history of 
philosophy consisting entirely of anecdotes? 
By ‘anecdote’, I mean a short, freestanding 
account of an event involving named 
figures, one that may or may not be literally 
true. This definition excludes narratives 
that work at the level of fable – Buridan’s 
vacillating ass, for instance – but it includes 
most of what we generally pick out with 
the term. 
You probably know the sort of thing I 
mean; conversation between philosophers 
is full of them. Some of them are the mean 
stuff of gossip about one’s colleagues 
(‘Would you believe what X said to Y at 
the seminar yesterday?’). Others are the 
well-attested stories that have passed into 
disciplinary legend – that time Wittgenstein 
threatened Karl Popper with a poker, or 
when A.J. Ayer interceded with Mike Tyson 
when he was harassing the model Naomi 
Campbell at a party, or when Elizabeth 
Anscombe responded to a snooty maître d’ 
telling her that women in trousers weren’t 
allowed at a restaurant by taking hers off. 
Other stories, equally well-attested, 
are less well-known. I am especially fond 
of a titbit about John Stuart Mill’s chaste 
courtship of Harriet Taylor, then married  
to another man, that I discovered in 
Nicholas Capaldi’s biography. Anxious  
for their reputation, and longing for some 
privacy from the wagging tongues of  
19th-century London, “Mill and Harriet 
would meet in the London Zoo, just a 
short walk from the Taylor residence at 
Kent Terrace, within sight of the rhinoceros, 
whom they referred to as their ‘old friend 
Rhino’”. I did once get into a violent 
debate with a psychoanalytically inclined 
philosopher who saw in the caged 
rhinoceros a tragic symbol of the Mills’ 
gnarled, sublimated sexuality. To my mind 
it’s a lovely story, sweet and sad. And the 
rhino is just a rhino.
Most of these stories are not, in any direct 
way, of philosophical interest, beyond 
what they might tell us of a philosopher’s 
personal foibles. In particular, they have 
the usually salutary effect of reminding us 
that the philosophers of the canon were 
human. But typically, they merely confirm 
something one already believed about the 
philosopher in question – that Wittgenstein 
was intense and irascible, Ayer urbane 
and cocky, Anscombe audacious, and Mill 
Victorian.
In contrast to these (almost certainly 
true) stories, there are anecdotes that 
function as just-so stories: poorly sourced, 
questionably true, but nevertheless able to 
say the non-obvious about philosophers 
and their philosophy. An excellent and early 
example of this kind of anecdote appears 
in Aristotle’s Partibus Animalium. I imagine 
Aristotle narrating it to a sceptical, slightly 
disgusted, audience, disappointed to find 
the eminent philosopher discoursing not 
on the good, the true and the beautiful,  
but on the anatomy of animals. 
... one must not be childishly repelled 
by the examination of the humbler 
animals. For in all things of nature there 
is something wonderful. ... Heraclitus is 
said to have spoken to the visitors who 
wanted to meet him and who stopped as 
they were approaching when they saw 
him warming himself by the oven – he 
urged them to come in without fear, for 
there were gods there too ...
Did Heraclitus ever say this? We have no 
way of knowing. Aristotle doesn’t seem 
sure himself (‘Heraclitus is said to have’), but 
evidently, it doesn’t matter to him either 
way. The story expresses, obscurely but 
powerfully, a truth that is independent of 
the truth of the story itself. There are gods 
here too: that is to say, there is truth and 
beauty to be found in the body parts of the 
octopus no less than in the rational faculties 
of the human animal. 
Another text from roughly the same 
period puts anecdote to good use. Plato’s 
Republic begins with a sentence that 
sounds like it is about to relay a juicy bit 
of gossip. “I went down to the Piraeus 
yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston”. 
This seems like the set up for a bawdy story 
about what they got up to (‘What happens 
in the Piraeus stays in the Piraeus!’). Of 
course, the narrative swiftly shifts gears and 
we find ourselves in the middle not of a 
punchy anecdote but a shaggy dog story. 
At the Piraeus, Socrates and his 
companions are invited to the house of 
Cephalus. Socrates asks him how he’s 
finding old age. Cephalus has a pertinent 
anecdote ready to hand: “I was once 
present when someone asked the poet 
Sophocles: ‘How are you as far as sex goes, 
Sophocles? Can you still make love with a 
woman?’. ‘Quiet, man’, the poet replied, ‘I am 
very glad to have escaped from all that, like 
a slave who has escaped from a savage and 
tyrannical master’.”
This is the first appearance of the central 
theme of the Republic: the power of the 
non-rational appetites to disrupt reason 
and justice and the helplessness of the  
man subject to his appetites. Plato might 
also be having an early dig at the poets 
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and foreshadowing the end of the Republic, 
when Socrates, notoriously, banishes the 
poets (ignorant, appetite-ridden dealers in 
illusion) from the ideal city. Plato’s utopia 
is a place where you don’t need to wait for 
old age to be free from the tribulations of 
desire. All this is advertised, with subtlety 
and economy, in a short and funny 
exchange. 
There is another kind of anecdote, which, 
unlike these Greek examples, claims to 
be (and probably is) true in a literal sense, 
but which doesn’t so much confirm the 
conventional assessment of a philosopher’s 
personality as it calls it into question. 
Anecdotes of this kind tend not to make 
the anthologies. They are not funny 
enough, not pointed enough, and haven’t 
reached the perfection of structure only 
attainable through multiple, and potentially 
falsifying, tellings. But for precisely this 
reason, they can add something distinctive 
to our picture of the history of philosophy.
The French novelist Stendhal prized 
a certain, half-formed, messy, kind of 
anecdote for precisely this reason. “Just 
think”, he wrote, “that what fools despise as 
gossip is, on the contrary, the only history 
that in this affected age gives a true picture 
of a country. … We need to see everything, 
experience everything, make a collection  
of anecdotes”.
What becomes, for 
instance, of the common 
estimation of Nietzsche 
as a pitiless admirer 
of amoral strongmen 
when one learns of an 
episode from the end 
of his intellectually 
active life. As his recent 
biographer Julian Young 
tells the story, “Seeing 
a coachman thrashing 
his horse with a whip 
in one of Turin’s piazzas, 
Nietzsche threw his 
arms around the horse’s 
neck, tears streaming 
from his eyes, and then 
collapsed onto the 
ground”. What does 
this story tell us? That 
this sudden outburst of 
sentimentality was the 
sign of his imminent 
descent into madness? 
Or that the conventional 
view of his psychology 
was a mistake, at any 
rate, radically simplistic? 
The latter is the view 
of Bernard Williams, one 
of Nietzsche’s most eloquent Anglophone 
admirers who thought that the brutality 
and ruthlessness many readers see in 
Nietzsche was, at most, something he 
aspired to, not the whole truth about his 
temperament. Indeed, the affectation 
of ruthlessness was itself the product of 
something the story of the horse brings out 
with great force: that Nietzsche was acutely 
sensitive to suffering. Not only that, writes 
Williams, he refused “to forget ... the fact 
that suffering was necessary to everything 
that he and anyone else valued”. 
The anecdote cannot yield all this on its 
own; there’s no getting around reading the 
actual works. Indeed, Nietzsche was aware 
of the dangers of brevity. While he admired 
the French aphorists Rochefoucault and 
Chamfort for the courage and concision 
with which they conveyed uncomfortable 
truths, he feared lapsing into mere swagger 
and smugness. The effect of the best 
philosophical anecdotes is, like Nietzsche’s 
remarks in The Gay Science (or indeed, 
much in the later writings of Wittgenstein) 
cumulative. The more one comes to know, 
about philosophers, philosophy, or life, the 
more one is able to see in them. 
Nakul Krishna is a Temporary Lecturer 
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Was Nietzsche misunderstood?
New Directions project update
New Directions in the Study of the 
Mind is a research project in the 
Faculty supported by the John 
Templeton Foundation. The project 
aims to investigate questions about 
intentionality and consciousness 
from a non-physicalist, non-reductive 
perspective. It runs from July 2015  
to July 2017. 
Since the start of the project, 
director Tim Crane, together with 
team members Alex Grzankowski, 
Chris Meyns, Craig French, and Raamy 
Majeed, have been running a weekly 
seminar on consciousness, as well  
as regular expert meetings on  
recent work. 
The team has co-organized a 
workshop on Immateriality with  
John Marenbon’s project ‘Immateriality, 
Thinking, and the Self in the Philosophy 
of the Long Middle Ages’, and hosted 
an explosive meeting of the Mind 
Network UK.
Supplementing its own activities,  
the project also funds a number 
of smaller research initiatives on 
non-physicalist, non-reductionist 
approaches to the mind. Initiatives 
funded so far are in philosophy, 
linguistics and psychology, and take 
place all over the world. Details on 
initiatives can be found on the project 
website: http://newdirectionsproject.
com. A new call for proposals will  
open in the Summer of 2016.
 In its second year, the project will 
run a workshop on intentionality 
(Spring 2017), and a capstone event, 
The Human Mind Conference, to 
showcase results achieved by the 
project (Summer 2017).
